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Summary
Customs authorities in developing countries are often reluctant to forgo systematic
inspections for fear of risking revenue loss. Such physical inspections, however, impede
rather than facilitate trade. Control selectivity is therefore a key issue in customs
administration reform. This paper shows how a sophisticated risk management method can
facilitate trade by automatically and rationally selecting transactions, with the end result of
actually enhancing revenue performance.
Résumé
Les contrôles physiques des marchandises importées, opérés souvent de façon systématique
par les administrations douanières, constituent l’une des entraves les plus importantes à la
facilitation du commerce dans les pays en développement. La sélectivité des contrôles est
pour cette raison considérée comme un élément-clé des réformes des administrations
douanières. Cependant, très souvent, les autorités hésitent à mettre en place cette
sélectivité par peur de perdre des recettes. Cet article explique et vérifie empiriquement
que, si une méthode sophistiquée d’analyse de risque est utilisée pour sélectionner
automatiquement et rationnellement les opérations, la sélectivité des contrôles ne
compromet en rien les performances de recettes, bien au contraire.
Key words: customs controls, moral hazard, risk management, fiscal revenues, trade
facilitationCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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I.   INTRODUCTION
The easing of constraints on international trade is a key factor in globalization. This is
especially the case for developing countries if they are to obtain their fair share of the
benefits of globalization. Among these constraints, the problems in customs administrations
are the most significant. Thus many developing countries have undertaken ambitious
modernization and reform in customs administration to combat corruption and encourage
good governance. The challenge is to facilitate trade while safeguarding government
revenue. In fact, even though trade liberalization in recent years has encouraged a decline in
tariff rates, external trade taxes still account for an average of over 25 percent of government
revenues in developing countries, and a sizable proportion of domestic indirect taxation is
collected at border areas.
Developing countries still inspect most of the goods physically and systematically during
their customs clearance process. Targeted inspections prior to the release of merchandise
would minimize the burden of this process. Customs administrations nonetheless tend to
view control selectivity with skepticism even when the authorities themselves have embarked
upon a modernization program. This is mainly because targeted inspections are perceived as
jeopardizing customs revenues.
The purpose of this paper is to show that with the careful design and operational
implementation of an appropriate targeting method, there is no risk of jeopardizing revenue
performance—quite the contrary, in fact.
II.   WHY TARGET CUSTOMS CONTROLS?
Failure to apply customs controls in developing countries: a chronic problem of
uncertain, asymmetrical information and moral hazard 
1
Information is a critical factor in customs control issues. If information were perfect with
respect to both the reputations of the various importers and the characteristics of the goods
imported, customs inspections could be successfully targeted: there would be no point in
attempting to inspect the entire volume of merchandise. Customs fraud would then
eventually disappear. However, information is imperfect, in the sense that it is uncertain and
asymmetrical.
2 To resolve this problem, the customs administration must implement
mechanisms to collect information and minimize moral hazard.
                                                
1 For greater detail regarding these issues, see Macho-Stadler and Pérez Castrillo (2001).
2 At the time of a customs transaction, the customs officer cannot know in advance if the importer’s declaration
is fraudulent (thus he cannot know for certain the characteristics of the imported goods—type, quality, value,
etc.). At the same time, the customs administration cannot know in advance if the customs control personnel are
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 In the interest of safeguarding customs revenues, the customs administrations of developing
countries have relied upon systematic inspection of all  transactions to determine the
characteristics of imported  merchandise. Unfortunately, the effect of this costly procedure
has been limited as it has neglected the importance of moral hazard; customs administrations
have been unable to control the behavior of their own personnel. In developing countries,
moral hazard has taken the form of widespread corrupt practices (collusion, pressuring,
racketeering, etc.). Implementing a system of incentives (compensation, bonuses,
promotions, recognition, etc.) can certainly encourage customs officers to conduct
themselves in an ethical fashion. Moreover, the customs administration can set up a contract
which encourages the customs officer to act in the interest of the community and not in his or
her own interest. These kinds of contracts do not, however, effectively limit moral hazard
unless the benefits available compensate for the kickbacks anticipated by the customs
officers, weighted by the risk of penalty (notably disqualification from civil service
employment). In this connection, Eskeland and Thiele (1999) have shown that increasing
incentives without implementing significant penalties is ineffective in combating corruption.
However, such policies seldom go side-by-side in developing countries.
Frequently, encouraged by international institutions, developing countries
3 have resorted to
private inspection companies to remedy the authorities’ shortcomings in customs controls.
These firms physically inspect (generally prior to shipment
4) most of the goods and thus
identify information on the characteristics of the imported goods (type, quality, etc.). The
firms also provide customs with valuations of the  merchandise and the amounts of duties
and taxes to assess. Each assessment is relatively high because it falls within a range of 0.8–
1.5 percent of the f.o.b. value of the import transaction, depending upon the companies and
contracts concerned; it is paid for by importers in most cases. However, because in most
countries the customs authorities reserve the right to inspect the  merchandise physically
upon arrival and question the information provided by these firms, moral hazard is endemic
and revenue flows suffer (Dutz, 2000; Johnson, 2001).
Consequences of the ineffectiveness of systematic physical inspections of goods prior to
their release
The ex ante, systematic, and inefficient inspection of merchandise encumbers customs
procedures unduly and undermines the goal of facilitating trade; furthermore, it does nothing
to secure revenue.
Mobilizing customs  personnel to conduct prior inspection operations  could undermine the
effective implementation of World Trade Organization (WTO) customs valuations. The
WTO “transaction value” is now legally the major method for the valuation of goods. The
                                                                                                                                                      
acting ethically (i.e., whether they are making every effort to detect fraud, and whether they are refusing to
profit from the professional position for personal gain at the expense of the community).
3 According to a survey conducted with these companies in June 1999, 37 developing countries were using this
type of service.
4 This means a double inspection for transactors.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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direct references which the WTO Agreement makes to the various aspects of the commercial
transaction—in particular, the price paid—means that visual examination of goods for
valuation purposes is barely relevant. The price paid should thus be the primary criterion in
the initial inspections. Except in cases of blatant fraud, the customs authorities at the physical
inspections prior to the release of the goods possess neither the data nor the know-how
required to dispute this valuation on sound and well-reasoned foundations. Given the reduced
role for prior inspections since the adoption of the new valuation system, these  inspections
unjustifiably obstruct  the international trade. Furthermore, using customs personnel for
routine inspections takes them away from in-depth post release controls, which alone are
capable of ensuring effective verification of the value—and hence of the taxable base—
in today’s changed environment.
The systematic retention of prior customs inspections—which are exceptionally burdensome
for economic agents
5—serves to entrench practices responsible for the persistence of fraud
and corruption. Such inspections foster collusion between  importers and customs personnel,
who misappropriate (and share out among themselves in the form of rent) a portion of the
potential customs revenues.
Targeted customs inspections: a vital step forward
Thus strong arguments —trade facilitation, the need to redeploy personnel more effectively,
and the change in mindset needed to make the switch to an up-to-date customs system—exist
for limiting the physical inspections carried out prior to the release of goods This shift in
policy reflects the spirit of the revised Kyoto Convention, which is intended to standardize
and harmonize customs procedures at the international level under the principles of
simplification, automation, and efficiency.
6
As corruption is a major impediment to efficient customs inspections in developing
countries, one priority objective must be to minimize the opportunities for collusion between
importers and customs personnel. Now, customs officers wield the most bargaining power
before the  merchandise is cleared—hence the need to minimize prior customs customs
inspections and defer most inspections ex post facto.
7 This is especially important because,
quite apart from jeopardizing revenue performance, corruption is a major source of economic
inefficiency. Collusion between the importer and the customs inspector can mean that
products of lower cost and/or of doubtful quality end up on the market. Local producers and
importers who are not guilty of fraudulent behavior are thus confronted with unfair
                                                
5 In the sense that they are costly in terms of time wasted, the financing of inventories, insecure supply, and
delays in production.
6 The revised Kyoto Convention was adopted by the World Customs Organization (WCO) in June 1999.
7 Needless to say, such a shift must be supported by appropriate personnel training. Such activities are a key
component of plans to modernize customs administrations ( cf. Keen, 2003).
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competition. “Good products” (good importers) are accordingly driven out of the market by
“bad products” (bad importers).
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Even if limiting physical inspections prior to the release of merchandise—and by extension,
selectively targeting transactions for inspection—is both desirable and unavoidable,
this change in policy is hampered by the reluctance on the part of (1) personnel, who will
have to undergo retraining and who anticipate a sharp drop in their personal income, and (2) 
authorities, who—in developing countries in particular—must operate under severe
budgetary constraints and who are reluctant to release (without inspection) merchandise that
they view as collateral for taxes and duties. These are serious concerns at both the
microeconomic and the macroeconomic level. To allay these concerns and overcome the
skepticism of the authorities, it is essential to identify the best way to target customs
inspections without sacrificing budget revenue.
III.   ORGANIZING TARGETED INSPECTIONS
Traditional method for targeting operations
Most developed countries and some developing countries, select customs transactions for
inspection using traditional targeting techniques. In principle, customs transactions fall into
three levels of control: (1) “green channel,” with no controls; (2) “orange channel,” with in-
depth documentary examination; and (3) “red channel,” with in-depth documentary control
and physical inspection of goods.
Apart from the inspections performed systematically in response to information gathered on
particular, fraudulent trade flows, customs transactions are targeted using risk criteria.
Customs administration personnel monitoring transaction records usually identify risk
criteria on the basis of judgment and experience. This method poses problems at two levels:
the process is highly dependent on human intervention and judgment, and keeping abreast of
the latest fraudulent practices requires a great deal of effort. The results obtained from this
targeting technique are better in developed countries where implicit contracts entered into by
the customs administration and customs personnel (incentives/penalties) are broadly
complied with. In the developing countries, excessive dependence on the human factor
encourages corruption and fraud. The lingering presence of this moral hazard makes
it impossible to get at the facts, and adversely affects the efficiency of the inspection process
itself. In addition, beyond rendering targeting ineffective, it may also have the perverse effect
of favoring fraudulent importers (adverse selection) who thanks to collusion utilize the
“green channel” as a matter of course, thereby penalizing honest importers.
                                                
8 Here we are once again confronted with the problem of adverse selection identified by Akerlof (1970) based
on the example of the second-hand car market, in which good-quality vehicles are crowded out by poor-quality
models.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
7
Accordingly, the only effective means of targeting customs inspections in developing
countries would be to minimize the involvement of customs officers so as to limit moral
hazard. To ensure efficiency and to eliminate customs officers’ discretion in choosing which
transactions to inspect, the method should be  based on statistical inference methods of risk
analysis of the kind developed by the financial sector.
9
More sophisticated method(s): automatic and rational targeting of transactions
The goal is to prepare a system to support decisions concerning which transactions to target
for verification.  Simple risk assessment criteria coupled with a thorough examination of the
databases for commercial transactions should determine the selection of transactions.
Moreover, private firms engaged in pre-shipment inspections of import transactions are
currently offering new targeting techniques designed using their own historical records. A
system for the targeting of transactions must be suitably powerful to predict the risk of fraud.
For each transaction, the risk assessment—in common with a traditional targeting method—
should help arrive at the different levels of customs control (for example, green, orange, or
red).
The transaction targeting system should focus on the salient features of an international trade
transaction, namely the origin of the goods and the trade routing, the goods traded, and the 
economic agents involved.
The source and routing of the merchandise are important because they reveal anomalous
trade channels. Anomalies are identified on the basis of data for the most customary and
normal commercial transactions: the country of origin and country of last export for the
merchandise are key factors in assessing any presumption that rules and regulations have
been complied with. The place where the invoice was issued and the port (or airport) of
embarkation (misapplication of trade flows, intermediary compensated, etc.) are also key
factors. The nature of the goods (liability for taxation, restrictions, prohibitions, restrictive
measures, quality controls, preferential tariff arrangements) and valuation are two key factors
for determining fraud. The transactors  concerned are the final piece in the puzzle: the
importer may be the primary transactor, but other operators are also involved in the sequence
of operations (the exporter, the shipper, the banker, the freight forwarder, etc.). On the basis
of these components, it is possible to design a targeting system which identifies information
by combining four different approaches:
The first approach consists in checking all new transactions, to the extent that they affect
one transactor, one type of merchandise or one routing on which the database provides no
information, and which must therefore be viewed in isolation from the historical record. This
systematic inspection process should encourage transactors to identify themselves correctly.
Correct identification is essential for the customs administration (but also for the tax
                                                
9 See Freixas and Rochet (1997).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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administration) inasmuch as post release controls are expected gradually to take over from
prior inspections of merchandise.
The second approach derives from examining the documents included in the importation
file and statistically reviewing comprehensive series and background information in order
to draw conclusions regarding the risks of fraud. For each transaction, this second approach
determines the likelihood of fraud on the basis of objective risk criteria determined by
statistical inference methods (rational method). The initial step involves determining the
fraud criteria using an ex post analysis of the trade database. A database is thus a prerequisite
for carrying out any ex post analysis of fraud. Each characteristic of an international trade
operation (concerning the routing, the merchandise, and the transactors) constitutes a
potential « fraud criterion ». Each criterion receives a notation between 0 and 1, a basic score
which reflects the frequency of fraud associated with the criterion in question. An
econometric analysis selects and weights the relevant criterion.
The second step consists in applying the weighted criteria to each new transaction in order to
determine the likelihood of fraud (final score) for that particular transaction, and ultimately
the level of custom control.
The third approach—which is more radical—focuses on the systematic inspection of a
transaction (i.e., blocking the release of shipment pending inspection) on the basis of
factors linked to certain of the transaction’s characteristics (e.g., operations involving
an amount exceeding x units of value, the fact that the economic agent in question has
undergone no inspections in the last x weeks, etc.).
The fourth approach involves a purely random selection. This method ensures that the
inspections are not allowed to follow a predictable pattern, while making it possible to adjust
the rate of inspection.
In conclusion, the general system determines the likelihood of fraud for each new transaction
and accordingly—since the proportion of transactions chosen for inspection has been
determined by the competent authorities—selects the control channel for the customs
transaction in an automatic and rational (i.e., not subjective) manner.
IV.   EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUTOMATIC AND
RATIONAL TARGETING OF TRANSACTIONS FOR INSPECTION
In developing countries, the ineffectiveness of systematic customs inspections and frequent
collusion between customs officers and importers mean that historical records on customs
reassessments fail to paint a representative picture of true or actual customs fraud. The poor
quality of the data obstructs the implementation of a system, as well as delaying trade
facilitation and modernization efforts.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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The approach described in the preceding section may help target transactions for inspection
without jeopardizing revenue, however, irrespective of the initial quality of the historical data
used to design the system.
Method
This approach is tested here for two African countries, A and B, which do not use selective
inspection of import transactions, with the result that their customs administrations perform
poorly. Country A has for several years been implementing a program for inspecting import
transactions by working with a private pre-shipment inspection company. Country A thus
theoretically possesses high-quality historical data on customs fraud and the magnitude of the
potential reassessments associated with them. Country B has never used the services of a
private pre-shipment inspection  pre-shipment company. Country B has, however, recorded
in its computer system all the reassessments deriving from systematic inspections conducted
by customs officers prior to releasing the goods. Intuitively, the “control selectivity” system
ought to pose greater risks in Country B than in Country A, because the initial information
upon which this approach is based is of poorer quality.
The databases made it possible to calculate 18 criteria for Country A and 28 criteria for
Country B. The scores assigned to each criterion were calculated differently for Country A
and Country B, reflecting the specific characteristics of each database. The database for
Country A covers the entire period of one year but not the full range of transactions,
inasmuch as the task of inspecting import transactions has been entrusted to a number of
private inspection companies. Country B’s database encompasses all the import transactions
for one quarter. For Country A, the calculated scores were determined on the basis of the
10 most recent operations for the criterion in question preceding each transaction; using
this method, the econometric adjustment of the weights is better than when all the prior
transactions are taken into account. For Country B, the short period covered by the database
has not made it possible to use the same procedure, and the scores were calculated on
the basis of the full set of transactions without taking account of the timing of their
appearance. For Country A, there is fraud when the private pre-shipment inspection company
records a reassessment of over US$200, and for Country B when customs administration




Estimating a PROBIT 
10 model for each country helps identify the key fraud criteria shown
in Table 1.
Table 1 – Econometric adjustment determining the weights for the risk criteria
Endogenous variable: fraud (0/1) Country A Country B
Exogenous variables
C1: Country of last export/product 1.56 1.03
C2: Importers 1.61
C3: Importers/country of last export 1.01
C4: Importers/products 2.33 5.03
C5: Importers/customhouses 1.15
C6: Rate of taxation 1.33
C7: Value of transaction 1.57
Constant - 3.09 -3.11
Pseudo-R² 0.66 0.77
Note: all the coefficients are significant at 1 percent level.
For Country A, the criteria “rate of taxation” and “value of transaction” may introduce a bias
in the estimates because these two variables may not be exogenous. In the absence of an
effective test to assess the problem of exogeneity in a PROBIT estimate, these two variables
have been retained because the estimates present a better pseudo-R² on a with-or-without
basis, and because the predictive power of the method is improved when they are included.
Coupled with the country of last export and with the importer, the “product” appears to be
the main yardstick for fraud in both countries. There are thus opportunities for fraud for
certain products, and certain importers who specialize in availing themselves of those
opportunities.
The two countries have different fraud criteria. Accordingly, the rate of taxation and the
value of transaction are the yardsticks in Country A, although not in Country B. That is partly
accounted for by the tariff structure of the two countries. Country A has a complex tariff
structure with rates that are both numerous and high, whereas Country B has a reformed,
simplified tariff structure with a comparatively modest maximum rate.
Finally, the relative degree of virtuous behavior of customs officers is clearly demonstrated
for Country B because the customhouse—coupled with the importer—is a source of fraud.
                                                
10 P(Yi=1)=f(￿jcj.xij); P(Y=1): likelihood of fraud for transaction i; f: normal distribution function; xij: basic
notation j assigned to transaction i.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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The predictive power of the method
Using these estimates concerning fraud criteria, the predictive power of the method can be
assessed. In fact, the aim is to recalculate on an ex post facto basis the total score that would
have been assigned to each transaction, taking account of its characteristics and the notations
assigned to each of the criteria,
11 and then determine whether the transaction was actually
fraudulent.
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for Countries A and B respectively. The transactions are
grouped together by final score in Column (1); Column (2) shows the number of transactions
which have a “calculated” final score falling between the upper and lower limits of each
category; Column (3) steadily accumulates the number of transactions starting with the
highest category (expressed as a percentage); Column (4) indicates the number of
transactions in each  category that have been the subject of some form of customs
reassessment; Column (5) presents the rate of reassessment by  category;
12 Column (6) shows
the number of reassessments for the category relative to the total number of reassessments;
Column 7 steadily accumulates the number of reassessments starting with the highest
category (expressed as %).
Table 2 makes it possible to verify the ability to predict the risk of fraud for Country A by
comparing Columns (3) and (7). Accordingly, by inspecting all those transactions which have
a score higher than 0.1—i.e., 25 percent of transactions—this method captures 93 percent of
the reassessments performed by the private inspection firm.
For Country B, the results are just as significant (Table 3). By inspecting 2.3 percent of
the transactions (i.e., those transactions with a total score greater than 0.1), this method captures 83.8
percent of the reassessments. These results suggest that in Country B, most of the reassessments
currently being performed are concentrated on a very small number of transactions, virtually all of
which possess the same characteristics.
                                                
11 Thus, for Country A, the likelihood of fraud (final score), indicated as PF, is obtained using the following
formula:
PF=f(-3.09 + 1.56 C1 + 1.61 C2 + 2.33 C4 + 1.33 C6 + 1.57 C7)
And for Country B:
PF=f(-3.11 + 1.03 C1 + 1.01 C3 + 5.03 C4 + 1.15 C5)
12 Column (4) divided by Column (2) expressed as a percentage.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[0.9; 1] 3546 9 3455 97 54 54
[0.8; 0.9] 530 11 411 78 6 60
[0.7; 0.8] 457 12 314 69 5 65
[0.6; 0.7] 429 13 259 60 4 69
[0.5; 0.6] 494 14 256 52 4 73
[0.4; 0.5] 552 16 274 50 4 77
[0.3; 0.4] 678 17 272 40 4 81
[0.2; 0.3] 1005 20 335 33 5 87
]0.1; 0.2] 2165 25 403 19 6 93
[0; 0.1] 28797 100 455 2 7 100
Total 38653 6434 17



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[0.9; 1] 870 1.3 843 96.9 62.5 62.5
[0.8; 0.9] 29 1.4 19 65.5 1.4 63.9
[0.7; 0.8] 49 1.4 24 49.0 1.8 65.7
[0.6; 0.7] 51 1.5 26 51.0 1.9 67.6
[0.5; 0.6] 81 1.6 33 40.7 2.4 70.1
[0.4; 0.5] 56 1.7 34 60.7 2.5 72.6
[0.3; 0.4] 87 1.9 46 52.9 3.4 76.0
[0.2; 0.3] 113 2.0 36 31.9 2.7 78.7
]0.1; 0.2] 196 2.3 69 35.2 5.1 83.8
[0; 0.1] 146856 100 219 0.1 16.2 100
Total 148388 1349 0.9CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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The quality of the econometric adjustment for Country A seems better than for Country B.
In Country A, the rate of reassessment by  category(5) declines with the calculated likelihood
of fraud (1): this is not the case for Country B. This would tend to demonstrate that the pre-
inspection carried out by a private company in Country A is better able to identify the risk of
fraud. However, given the low number of transactions included in the intermediate  category
for Country B, that does not undermine the validity of the method nor does it pose a real
prediction problem for that country. Furthermore, the improvements in the quality of the
inspections carried out by the inspectors and the customs declarations filed by  economic
agents—as the expected consequences of implementing a targeting system—should make it
possible to bring the database gradually up to the required standard and thus enhance the
overall effectiveness of the system for the rational and automatic selection of customs
transactions for inspection.
The PROBIT-type estimates are based on the assumption of a normal distribution of the error
term (Gauss rule). In the case of a distribution not in conformity with the Gauss rule, the
coefficients for the exogenous variables (fraud factors) are biased and the predictions of
fraud are erroneous. The relevance of the model can nonetheless be determined by
calculating the number of false predictions. For each observation where the likelihood of
fraud is 1, one looks to see whether an instance of fraud has actually been found. Thus, for
those transactions included in the [0.9; 1] score category—i.e., those which have a likelihood
of fraud of almost 1—only 2.5 percent of the transactions were incorrectly predicted for
Country A and 3.1 percent for Country B. In addition, for each observation where the
likelihood of fraud is close to 0 [0; 0.1]), the incorrect predictions represent 1.6 percent for
Country A and 0.1 percent for Country B. By themselves, these upper and lower categories
represent 83.6 percent and 99.5 percent of transactions for Country A and Country B,
respectively (Tables 2 and 3).
Likely impact on revenues
If one postulates a significant relationship between the number of cases of fraud identified
and the anticipated amounts of tax and duty reassessments resulting from these fraudulent
transactions, the additional revenue in the two countries may be deduced.
In Country A: The revenue impact will depend on the extent to which the customs
administration and the private inspection company can work together effectively. If this
cooperation is negligible, then the direct impact on revenues (following the targeting of
inspections conducted by the company) will be zero. In fact, the situation should not be
expected to change significantly. If the customs authorities use the information provided
without questioning it, then the revenue performance will be maintained thanks to the
optimal predictive power of the method. If the customs administration in Country A carries
out its own inspections without regard for the information generated by the company, then
the targeting  will show no improvement in revenues and the private company’s efforts will
continue to have zero effect on revenues. In short, the targeting of customs inspections in
both examples will change neither the moral hazard nor the quality of the information.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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Conversely, provided the targeting of inspections is accompanied by meaningful cooperation
between the company and the customs administration (which initially doubts the information
provided to it), the quality of the information used will improve and the moral hazard will
fade. In this case, the revenue impact will be positive.
In any event, the overall cost of the pre-shipment inspection company’s services can be
expected to decline significantly over time as the number of inspections performed by the
company diminishes. The reduction in costs, however, is not expected to be too great at the
outset in view of the costs entailed by the design and operational implementation of the
targeting system, if operated by the pre-shipment inspection company, and not by the
customs administration itself.
In Country B: The satisfactory predictive power of the method ensures revenue stability in
the short term. At the same time, the fact that this method is rational and automatic—while
minimizing moral hazard—will help to raise revenues in the medium term. In fact, the state
can expect to recoup a sizable portion of the rents formerly shared out among customs
officers and  economic agents. Furthermore, the redeployment of personnel previously
engaged in physical inspections of merchandise to post release controls (in which the moral
hazard is reduced), can be expected gradually to enhance the quality of the latter controls.
This will improve the quality of the database, and thus of the available information. This
enhancement of the information will in turn have a beneficial impact on revenue.
V.   CONCLUSION
Targeted customs inspections ( previously relatively uncommon in developing countries) are
now a prerequisite for facilitating trade as well as for safeguarding customs revenues.
Such inspections must therefore be a priority in programs for modernizing customs
administrations. The results of the analyses presented in this paper show that provided the
targeting method is well chosen, selectively targeted inspections do not jeopardize revenue
performance, and may have a positive impact on revenue levels. These beneficial effects will
be enhanced if the selectively targeted inspections go hand-in-hand with the customs
administrations’ efforts to achieve meaningful progress in related areas (computerization,
personnel training, and management, in particular).
In the two cases described in this paper, the automatic and rational targeting of transactions
for inspection ensures at least the same level of revenue as systematic inspections.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the use of a private company—supposedly a
guarantee of good-quality historical data—is not essential for developing such a system
without sacrificing revenue.
13 Conversely, if they wish to use these methods, customs
                                                
13 Conversely, the use of a private company may be justified for other reasons (for example, because there is
too much resistance within the customs administration to the implementation of selectively targeted
inspections).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
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administrations must ensure that their computer systems incorporate data on customs
reassessments.
Paradoxically, it is in those countries where customs administrations are least effective that
the authorities must swiftly begin using the most sophisticated techniques to minimize moral
hazard. The greater the initial moral hazard is, the greater the beneficial impact on revenues
will be. Also paradoxically, it is in those countries where the data are initially poorest that
the greatest potential revenue gains are to be realized through the use of selective targeting.
Reducing moral hazard makes it possible to improve the quality of information—and
consequently improve the results of the inspections—thereby building a kind of momentum
ensuring effective customs inspections.
Developing country governments need not hesitate about implementing systems for the
targeting of transactions for inspection for fear of  losing revenue. This change in attitude
ought to encourage them rapidly to incorporate appropriate risk analysis—a key factor in
trade facilitation—into their overall strategies for modernizing their customs administrations.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.16
16
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